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L

EGAL canons have made a comeback. We can quite firmly put to
rest the old lament that legal interpretation is understudied and
undertheorized, and with it, the idea that “legal canons” are not a major
part of that story.1 For some thirty years now, since the rise of new
textualism, judges and legal academics have closely reexamined the role
of legal canons. We now recognize these canons as “established principle[s] . . . of law universally admitted, as being a correct statement of the
law, or as agreeable to natural reason.”2 And we very frequently see them
appear alternately in the varied opinions of self-avowed textualists and
non-textualists alike, like so many interpretive tools-turned-rhetorical* Professor of Law, Professor of History; faculty director of the Program in Islamic Law at Harvard Law School. This Article is based on the Donald A. Giannella Memorial Lecture given at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law on October
22, 2020. The author would like to thank Michael Moreland, Melanie Dudley, and the
Eleanor H. McCullen Center for Law, Religion and Public Policy at Villanova Law
School for the honor of the invitation to present the lecture, as well as the student editors for their good work in publishing this Article that developed from it. This Article
takes its main title from an article by Richard Posner that accompanied the rise of new
textualism, which features legal canons, as noted infra in note 1.
1. See Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800 (1983). For earlier instances of the old claim and advancement of a slightly new one of chaos, see ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN GARNER,
READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 8 (2012) (first citing MORRIS
COHEN, LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 128 (1933); then
citing HENRY M. HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS (10th ed. 1958)) (asserting that it is no “exaggeration to say that the field of interpretation is rife with confusion”).
2. Legal Maxim, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
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weapons to justify opposing outcomes, both in the classroom and in the
courtroom.
Notably, this recent “canons comeback” is not a unique feature of
American law. It applies to both American law and Islamic law, in ways
that may offer comparative insight when considering that the Islamic law
context comes with a centuries-long tradition of interpreting law with legal canons. Exploring that history may provide insight for understanding
the enduring salience of legal canons and their current comeback, not
just in one legal tradition, but two. That history might also aid in grasping the reasons for which interpreters devise and deploy canons in the
first place, and of the interpretive reach of legal canons in systems that
seem committed to canons in both the courtroom and the classroom.
Before tracing that history, we begin with the familiar—with American law. In the American courtroom, virtually every statutory interpretation case at the Supreme Court of late features “dueling canons,” facing
off on the meaning or application of ambiguous laws.3 Did Facebook, before becoming Meta,4 feature an “autodialer” that entitles individuals to
sue the social media behemoth for unwelcome calls or texts? Writing for
a unanimous Court in Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid,5 Justice Sonia Sotomayor
used the series-qualifier canon to answer ‘no’ to the autodialer question—
thereby saving Facebook from yet another lawsuit, while Justice Samuel
Alito concurred separately solely to caution readers to view canons as
standards, not rules.6 Are fish “tangible objects” that support criminal
convictions if destroyed upon investigation for fraud? In Yates v. United
States,7 the late Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg used no less than seven different legal canons to answer “no” and thus decide against imposing laws
against destruction of evidence and other “tangible objects” for the fishdestroying petitioner. An again-concurring Justice Alito added discussion
of four canons, and Justice Elena Kagan, in dissent, referenced ten different canons in her failed attempt to uphold the conviction.8 Is a jilted wife
who poisons her adulterous neighbor in violation of laws that give effect
to a treaty banning “chemical weapons?” For an undivided Court in Bond
v. United States,9 Chief Justice John Roberts relied heavily on legal canons,
as did Justice Antonin Scalia in his concurrence, to say “no”: the rule of len-

3. On dueling canons, see Anita Krishnakumar, Dueling Canons, 65 DUKE L.J.
910–1006, 912 (2016); Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and
the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 396–406
(1950).
4. See Introducing Meta: A Social Technology Company, FACEBOOK (Oct. 28,
2021) https://about.fb.com/news/2021/10/facebook-company-is-now-meta [https://
perma.cc/4LNF-4XG8].
5. 141 S. Ct. 1163 (2021).
6. Id. at 1168 (Alito, J., concurring).
7. 574 U.S. 528 (2015).
8. Id.
9. 572 U.S. 844 (2014).
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ity and other canons required the Court to construe the criminal statute
narrowly.10
In the American classroom, law professors have responded to the
canons’ court-comeback, and now engage in active dialogue with the
courts about it. Leading law schools now feature, and sometimes require,
courses in legislation and statutory interpretation with a heavy dose of legal canons. Many of the professors who teach those courses and conduct
research on interpretation have filled thousands of law review pages in
empirical studies attempting to explain or critique the use, function, and
constraints or coherence (if any) of the legal canons.11 Moreover, judges
too have published articles and books on these very questions.12 And
courts have responded by considering the scholarly literature on legal
canons in their statutory interpretation decisions, as have petitioners, respondents, and amici in virtually every recent statutory interpretation
case.13
Helping to frame the canons comeback in the American classroom
and in the courtroom are two opposing approaches that have emerged
prominently in the form of two books that elevate some of the hundreds
(perhaps thousands) of principles and precedents produced by the
methods at play in each. From one side, the late Justice Antonin Scalia
and law dictionary-lexicographer Professor Bryan Garner published a
treatise on legal canons called Reading Law in 2012. Their book presents
10. Id.
11. To take just a few leading exemplars, see, e.g., Anita S. Krishnakumar, Backdoor
Purposivism, 69 DUKE L.J. 1275 (2020); Kevin P. Tobia, Testing Ordinary Meaning, 134
HARV. L. REV. 726 (2020) (with Appendix, at 1–43); Victoria Nourse, Textualism 3.0:
Statutory Interpretation After Justice Scalia, 70 ALA. L. REV. 667 (2019); Thomas R. Lee &
Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, 127 YALE L.J. 788 (2018); Ryan
Doerfler & William Baude, The (Not So) Plain Meaning Rule, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 539
(2017); Frederick Schauer, On the Relationship Between Legal and Ordinary Language, in
SPEAKING OF LANGUAGE AND LAW 35–38 (Lawrence Solan, Janet Ainsworth, & Roger
Shuy eds., Oxford 2015); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism and Normative
Canons, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 531 (2013) (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A.
GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012)); Jane S.
Schacter, Symposium: Statutory Interpretation: How Much Work Does Language Do?: Text or
Consequences?, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1007 (2011); John F. Manning, Second Generation
Textualism, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1287 (2010).
12. See, e.g., BRIAN G. SLOCUM, ORDINARY MEANING: A THEORY OF THE MOST
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION (2015); ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
JUDGING STATUTES (2014); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION (Princeton Univ. Press 1997); Brett Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV.
2118 (2016) (reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014), and written
before he became a Supreme Court Justice); Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons
and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. REV. 109 (2010) (written before she became a Supreme
Court Justice).
13. For multiple citations to scholarly literature on the history and use of legal
canons among other tools of interpretation in judicial opinions and related amici
briefs, see, e.g., Van Buren v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1648 (2021); Bostock v. Clayton
Cty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020); Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019); Sessions v.
Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018).
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a vision of textualism and originalism that centers on fifty-seven legal
canons accompanied by illustrative cases. The authors suggest that judges
should read only the text according to the way the Framers or enacting
legislators wrote them, and that legal canons—rather than pragmatics or
purpose—can well guide that task.14
From the opposite side, the doyen of dynamic interpretation, Professor William Eskridge, published his own volume a few years later, in 2016,
called Interpreting Law. His treatise presents a vision of pragmatic or dynamic statutory interpretation that shows where the legal canons used in
the courtroom came from, and he details how most judges actually use
those canons. Judges typically deploy canons pragmatically as interpretive
tools to fill gaps, allocate power, and otherwise “say what the law is” with
respect to purpose or policy-driven factors embedded in the statute itself.
The purpose-driven approach has, he argues, originalist bases: it comes
from the statutory interpretation approach originally understood as the
“mischief rule” (what mischief was the statute trying to address?) and the
recognition of equities of the statute.15
This basic disagreement on interpretation nicely zeroes in on the
point of divergence and sums up each approach right in the titles of these
battling books: Reading Law vs. Interpreting Law. Reading Law presumes
that there is a static, original, public meaning contained in the words of a
text and select legal canons, and courts must preserve the status quo unless a legislature decides otherwise. Interpreting Law points to dynamic
and evolving meanings of the words of a text, alongside a wider set of legal canons as supporting tools for interpreting those texts in ways that
seek to meet the purpose or change for which legislation—by definition—was enacted.
Remarkably, this basic disagreement in American law about approaches to statutory interpretation have a comparable precursor in Islamic law, which—lacking a legislature—carved out an even larger role
for legal canons than in U.S. law. The American parallel prompts the
question about how to best think about interpretation in Islamic law: is
Islamic law supposed to be about reading law according to the original
meaning of texts in ways designed to preserve the status quo (and, for
that matter, enlarge the power of judges claiming to rely only on texts)?
Or, is Islamic law supposed to be about interpreting law according to texts
that are supported by contextual clues that point to dynamic and evolving
meanings; is it supposed to respond to the “mischief” that motivated divine legislation in ways meant to resolve novel issues in full view of societal

14. SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 1.
15. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW TO READ
STATUTES AND THE CONSTITUTION (Foundation Press 2016); see also William N.
Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the “Judicial Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 1776–1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990 (2001); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR.,
DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (Harvard Univ. Press 1994).
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changes over time and space; and is it about the broad set of legal canons
that provide interpretive tools toward that end?
This Article seeks to address such pressing questions about Islamic
law by uncovering its history of interpretation at the point of the rise of
legal canons in thirteenth-century Egypt and Syria. In the process, it asks:
how do we make sense of the juristic approach to either reading or interpreting Islamic law?
The answer to that question is lodged in history that, I argue, can
come to light best under of the lens of legal canons-centered approaches
that Muslim scholars historically have used to explain or guide legal interpretation over time. This Article starts with that history at a moment
the principles and precedents that guide interpretation in Islamic law
were first codified en masse as an independent genre of law. That codification emerged from the ashes of Islam’s fallen caliphate at Baghdad in
1258. Following the Mongol invasion, a new sult n in Cairo initiated a
widespread and fairly well-known reform of the Islamic empire’s main judicial system: one chief judge for every major school, or approach, to interpretation. Less well-known is that the scholar-jurists of that sultan’s
time instituted their own widespread reform of the empire’s approach to
interpretation: one set of principles for every major area of law—drawn
from something like an interpretive common law and thus designed to
use principles from the Islamic past to help resolve issues of their changing present. Those jurists called these principles legal canons (qaw id
fiqhiyya), and used them as interpretive tools to adjudicate cases, to determine the scope of interpretation in legal treatises, and to teach law.
The result: a collection of interpretive principles that centered a complex
system of interpreting Islamic law, in a way that most modern onlookers do
not realize exist. Most modern onlookers also fail to realize that modern
American courtrooms and Islamic practices in classrooms discussing theories of statutory and constitutional interpretation both echo and offer
means to better organize earlier interpretive precedent.
I.

INTRODUCTION: THE BACKDROP

We begin in the middle of the thirteenth century. Not long after he
took power, a one-time slave soldier by the name of al- hir Baybars radically reformed the judiciary of the reconstituted eastern Muslim empire
effectively as the first Maml k sultan. The Mongols had decimated the
old seat of the Muslim empire in Baghdad in the winter of 656/1258.
They had dismantled the Muslim caliphate, and with it, the foundations
of systems of law and order. Sul n Baybars had in turn helped defeat the
Mongols in 658/1260, and immediately seized the throne.16 To solidify
16. See also Amalia Levanoni, The Maml ks in Egypt and Syria: The Turkish Maml k
Sultanate (648–784/1250–1382) and the Circassian Maml k Sultanate (784–923/1382–
1517), in THE NEW CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF ISLAM—VOLUME 2: THE WESTERN ISLAMIC
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his hold on power and territory, he first re-installed a caliph whom he
“represented,” fought the Crusaders, and imposed various economic
measures to secure his army and revenue.17 His focus was political legitimacy and power through the symbolic use of the caliph and the use of
force.18 Having established both over the first five years of his reign, he
then turned to domestic affairs and questions of religious legitimacy and
law.19 He began with some tentative reforms in 1262. But it was not until
663/1265 that he ordered a major judicial overhaul.20
The common view among historians is that, the structural reforms altered a long-standing institutional “symbiosis” that scholars credit with
guaranteeing a functioning system of Islamic law and governance.21 What
is this symbiosis? Scholars of Islamic law use this term to refer to the idea
that religious and political legitimacy in early Islamic societies, beginning
as early as the seventh century, relied on a balance between government
leaders and scholars of Islamic law. In that old system, the going view is
that jurists had the religious or epistemic authority to define law and mediate popular religion in judge-staffed courts; and the sultan had the power
to appoint judges and enforce court decisions. In that same scheme,
scholars understand the juristic and judicial opinions to make up the stuff
of Islamic law (shar a)—seen as an authoritative and enduring expression
WORLD, ELEVENTH TO EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES 237–84 (Maribel Fierro ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 2010); SHERMAN A. JACKSON, ISLAMIC LAW AND THE STATE: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF SHIH B AL-D N AL-QAR F (Brill 1996); NASSER O.
RABBAT, THE CITADEL OF CAIRO: A NEW INTERPRETATION OF ROYAL MAMLUK
ARCHITECTURE (Brill 1995); CARL F. PETRY, THE CIVILIAN ELITE OF CAIRO IN THE LATER
MIDDLE AGES (Princeton Univ. Press 1981).
17. See JACKSON, supra note 16, at 51; RABBAT, supra note 16, at 97–98 (describing
Baybars’s appointment to the caliphate an Abb sid fugitive—whom he named alMustansir Billeh II; he had survived the Mongol massacre at Baghdad and was appointed with the stipulation that he delegate his political authority to Baybars over
Egypt and Syria as well as the eastern provinces of the Hij z, Yemen, and all future
conquests). For discussion of Baybars’s administrative innovations, see RABBAT, supra
note 16, at 99; P. M. HOLT, THE AGE OF THE CRUSADES: THE NEAR EAST FROM THE
ELEVENTH CENTURY TO 1517 90–99 (Longman 1986).
18. On the significance and fall of the caliphate, see HÜSEYIN YILMAZ, CALIPHATE
REDEFINED: THE MYSTICAL TURN IN OTTOMAN POLITICAL THOUGHT (Princeton Univ.
Press 2018); MONA HASSAN, LONGING FOR THE LOST CALIPHATE: A TRANSREGIONAL
HISTORY (Princeton Univ. Press 2016); HUGH KENNEDY, WHEN BAGHDAD RULED THE
MUSLIM WORLD: THE RISE AND FALL OF ISLAM’S GREATEST DYNASTY (Da Capo Press
2005).
19. See Sherman A. Jackson, The Primacy of Domestic Politics: Ibn Bint Al-A’azz and the
Establishment of the Four Chief Judgeships in Mamluk Egypt, 115 J. AMER. ORIENTAL SOC’Y
52 (1995).
20. See JACKSON, supra note 16, at 51.
21. See, e.g, id. at xviii; Yossef Rapoport, Royal Justice and Religious Law: Siy sah and
Shari ah under the Mamluks,16 MAML K STUDS. REV. 72 (2012); Levanoni, supra note 16,
at 242; Yaacov Lev, Symbiotic Relations: Ulama and Mamluk Sultans, 13 MAML K STUDS.
REV. 1 (2009); ROBERT IRWIN, THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE MIDDLE AGES: THE EARLY
MAMLUK SULTANATE 1250–1382 (S. Ill. Univ. Press 1986); see also INTISAR A. RABB,
DOUBT IN ISLAMIC LAW: A HISTORY OF LEGAL MAXIMS, INTERPRETATION, AND ISLAMIC
CRIMINAL LAW (Cambridge Univ. Press 2015).
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of divine will; and we understand royal decrees to form executive policies
(siy sa) that could sometimes dictate the institutional structures in which
the jurists and judges operated. The executive policies were authorized
and legitimate so long as they ensured order and otherwise were perceived as serving the public interest.22
In this conventional scholarly account, any executive-led structural
changes affected the form of this old symbiosis but did not radically alter
the functions of Islamic law.23 That is, the common view is that executive
policies and political-governmental structures did not alter the basic processes of interpreting Islamic law. I beg to differ. No one to date has
deeply interrogated whether and how structural changes affected interpretations of Islamic law, the balance of power between the jurists and
judges on the one hand and government and military officials on the
other in their long-enduring symbiosis, and therefore the extent to which
structural changes helped judges and jurists define values or allocate
power through interpretation.24
It turns out, I argue, that the interpretive developments in Islamic law
were just as conspicuous as the structural ones for informing definitions
of law and governance, and were no less affected by the sultan’s reform. I
show how by exploring the case that ostensibly led to the reform, discuss
the legal canons that emerged in the wake of it, and then examine the
ways in which those legal canons form a type of interpretive precedent
that are key—in familiar ways to American lawyers—to interpreting Islamic law.
II. THE CASE: HEIRS OF AM R N IR V. HEIRS OF Q
BADR AL-D N AL-SINJ R ,
663/1265 CAIRO, SULT N BAYBARS PRESIDING
As noted, the judicial reform began with a case. Each week, Sult n
Bayar’s held court at the D r al- Adl: the “Palace of Justice” that he had
constructed just outside the Citadel in the empire’s capital city of Cairo.25
He used to sit with his top military officials alongside the single chief
judge of the realm, a Sh fi judge by the name of Ibn Bint al-A azz. This
was the royal court, which handled “extraordinary” cases involving government officials, public law matters of crime or taxation, and special dis22. WAEL HALLAQ, SHAR A: THEORY, PRACTICE TRANSFORMATIONS 201–09
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2009). For further debates about the sometimes blurred line
between siy sa and shar a, when speaking about religious and political authority see,
e.g., KHALED ABOU EL FADL, REASONING WITH GOD: RECLAIMING SHARI’AH IN THE
MODERN AGE (Rowman & Littlefield, 2017); FRANK E. VOGEL, ISLAMIC LAW AND LEGAL
SYSTEM: STUDIES OF SAUDI ARABIA (Brill, 2000); Mohammad H. Fadel, Adjudication in
the M lik Madhhab: A Study of Legal Process in Medieval Islamic Law 79–91 (unpublished
dissertation, UMI 1996).
23. See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 16, at 96; SHAR A, supra note 22, at 201–09.
24. One exception is Yossef Rapoport, who nevertheless does not explore the rise
and logic of legal canons in that process. See Rapoport, supra note 21, at 75.
25. See generally RABBAT, supra note 16.
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pensations or pardons that went beyond the ordinary questions of law
that the chief judge and his deputy judges addressed.26 But the chief
judge sat beside the sultan at this special royal court nonetheless, to give
input on an Islamic law interpretation of each case.
On one occasion, in the year 1265, two litigants sought resolution of
a matter that was ostensibly a private dispute about trusts and estates. But
the case turned out to have been about much more than the underlying
legal question. It implicated the very status of the institutional elite classes under the Maml ks, as well as of the proper scope for interpretation
of Islamic law. It was the high status of the litigants—representatives of a
deceased a judge and of a high-ranking military official—that landed this
case in the royal court.
A. The Story of the Case
The facts of the case and the direct legal issue at hand were fairly
straightforward. The daughters of a military leader, Am r N ir, were
heirs to his estate. They claimed to have bought a large house from a
judge, the late Q
Badr al-D n al-Sinj r , while he was still alive.27 But
when that judge died, his heirs claimed that when he was alive, he had instead converted the property in question into a charitable trust (waqf)
and bequeathed it to them. So the basic question was: who was entitled to
the property or its proceeds: the heirs of the judge or the heirs of the military officer?
Problems of potential judicial bias, rather than the legal issue itself,
soon revealed themselves. A senior military official present at the royal
court, the prominent emir, Jam l al-D n al-Aydugh , raised objections.
The basis of his claim is not entirely clear from the sources. Nevertheless,
those sources at least suggest that the problem was twofold: first, a decision for the heirs of the judge would privilege members of the judiciary
above members of the military. As a representative of the military elite,
he had to ensure that the military men’s material needs and interests
were met. Doing so also made pragmatic good sense: if soldiers and officers were to fight for him, they had to have an income—which typically
came from landed property and estates. Second, a decision for the heirs
of the judge was likely only plausible because of the chief judge’s acrobatics in Islamic legal interpretation: the military officer surmised that the
chief judge had likely interpreted the classical Islamic law of waqfs in a
way that exploited some loophole in order to enable the heirs of the
judge to even make their claim.
The sult n turned to the chief judge, not so for his legal opinion
about the case, but for his response to the senior military officer’s criti26. Jackson, supra note 19, at 54, 64.
27. Id. at 54; Jørgen S. Nielsen, Sult n Al-Z hir Baybars and the Appointment of Four
Chief Q d s, 663/1265, 60 STUDIA ISLAMICA 167 (1984).
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cism. The sult n asked the chief judge: “Is this how the judges (q d s)
are?”28 Chief judge Ibn Bint al-A azz responded with a vague platitude
that will seem commonplace to lawyers today—indicating that there are
complicated factors in every case—and further indicated that the waqfholders, who were heirs to the late judge, would prevail in some measure
in every scenario:
Your Highness, there are complications
What is the situation here? Asked the Sult n.

in

everything.

If the waqf is confirmed, the heirs reimburse the buyers.
And if the heirs have nothing? Asked the Sult n.
The waqf is confirmed, replied the qâdî, and the buyers receive
nothing.29
Put differently, the chief judge had advised that the proper way to
proceed would be for the heirs of the judge either to reimburse the heirs
of the military official for the alleged sale if indeed a waqf and sale could
be confirmed, and to maintain control over the waqf if they if they had no
monies with which to reimburse the heirs of the military. Essentially, his
solution was to form a presumption in favor of conferring the property on
the judge’s heirs and not on the heirs of the military officer.30 This was a
fine point of interpretation: waqf over sale and possession over claims of ownership—both reflecting two well-known legal canons, or presumptions.
These presumptions favoring the heirs of the judge, could only be overcome by clear testimonial evidence: typically two witnesses or a document
of sale (even if there was no documentation of the waqf), which the chief
judge had already rejected on grounds that the military men’s testimony
was unreliable.31
The sultan pressed the chief judge: well, what would happen if the
parties could not locate evidence of formation of a waqf? The thought
seemed to be that the property would likely go to the military officer’s
heirs. This same sultan had early-on instituted a policy requiring that the
heirs of maml k soldiers—even if not military men themselves—were to
inherit their decedent family member’s estates.32 He, after all, had an
army to feed, literally; and transfer of military property to their families
would sustain one of the most important parts of his military empire,
which had been founded by slave-soldiers like himself. But the controversy over the situation suggested that the military officer’s heirs would not
prevail outright under any circumstances that the chief judge had out28. Jackson, supra note 19, at 54.
29. Id. (translating a passage from the Maml k historian TAQ AL-D N AL-MAQR Z ,
1 KIT B AL-SUL K LI-MA RIFAT DUWAL AL-MUL K 538–539 (Ma ba at Dar al-Kutub alMi riyya 1936)).
30. Id. at 54; Nielsen, supra note 27, at 170.
31. Jackson, supra note 19, at 54.
32. Id. at 51.
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lined. That is, the judge’s heirs were to reimburse the emir’s heirs if the
sale was improper and still receive the proceeds from the trust, or else the
judge’s heirs were to keep the proceeds from the property sale even if not
specifically bequeathed to them.33 Either way, the judge’s heirs would
take something.34
The sources are less clear on the outcome—whether the judicial or
military heirs kept most of the property—and instead highlight the military men’s objections that led to a change in the judicial structure. It is
reasonable to assume that the judge’s heirs won, and that the military
men were prompted by what they saw as an unfair victory for the judge’s
heirs justified by the Sh fi law that the chief judge applied exclusively in
the courts.35
For the Maml k-era chroniclers recounting the story of this case, the
point of this story is not what actually happened. Instead, they focused
more on questions of the scope of judicial power concentrated in a single
chief judge, and the exclusivity of relying on a single school of law despite
the presence of multiple schools that may have given alternate outcomes.
They attributed to Am r Aydughd the exasperated retort in the aftermath
of the case, “Oh Q d , you may have your Sh fi’ madhhab; we shall appoint a q d from each of the schools of law”—a declaration that the sultan took seriously.36 All in all, for the historical chroniclers of the time,
this case represented the acute incident that sparked Sult n Baybars’s major judicial reform.
B. The Reform
The major reform came in the wake of that case. Sult n Baybars reformed the judiciary in several ways, but the main one was that he weakened the power of the single chief judge—who applied only the laws of
the Sh fi legal school—and distributed judicial responsibilities to Islam’s
other three mainstream legal schools. He appointed one chief judge for
every major approach to Islamic law at the time, that is, for every major
school of law (madhhab); and made the Sh fi judge first among equals in
coordinating between them. To put that in modern terms: Chief Judge
Ibn Bint al-A azz had become the John Roberts of his day, that is, if we too

33. Id. at 54; Nielsen, supra note 27, at 169–71.
34. See Nielsen, supra note 27, at 170, who gives this reading.
35. For a similar case from a cache of documents found in the sanctuary at the
Dome of the Rock from fourteenth-century Jerusalum, see Donald S. Richards,
Glimpses of Provincial Mamluk Society from the Documents of the Haram Al-Sharif in Jerusalem,
in THE MAMLUKS IN EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 51–52 (Michael
Winter & Amalia Levanoni eds., Brill 2004). For further studies of documents from
this cache, see HUDA LUTFI, AL-QUDS AL-MAMLÛKIYYA: A HISTORY OF MAMLÛK
JERUSALEM BASED ON THE ARAM DOCUMENTS (K. Schwarz 1985).
36. Jackson, supra note 19, at 54 (citing Escovitz, Four Chief Judgeships, at 529;
Nielsen, Sul n al- hir, at 170).
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had a system of appointing one originalist, pragmatist, textualist, etc.—
one judge for every major interpretive approach or ‘school’ of law.
To be sure, the case may have a contributing cause, but it was not the
only thing prompting the reform. The sources show that the sultan had
initiated changes to the judiciary even before this case. Three years prior,
in 1262, the sultan had directed the chief judge to appoint three juristscholars from the other Sunn schools as deputy judges: the anaf jurist
adr al-D n Muhammad b. Abd al-Haqq, the M lik jurist Sharaf al-D n
Umar al-Subk , and the anbal jurist Shams al-D n Mu ammad b.
Ibr h m.37
But after the case, the sultan realized that merely deputizing judges
was insufficient to curb the chief judge’s exercise of outsized power in all
manner of cases.38 Looking backward, it was the famed Abb sid caliph
H r n al-Rash d (d. 193/809) who had first established a chief judgeship
centuries earlier in Baghdad, and expanded his powers over the ordinary
judges affiliated with varied regional schools.39 Sul n H r n al-Rash d
had been operating from a position of strength.
In contrast, by Maml k times, the protracted Mongol invasions and
other internal problems in administration created a situation of weak
government and strong judges. The jurists and judges did more to bind
the Muslims together than did a strong centralized government; they
were seen as the legitimate exponents of Islamic law; and the chief judge
had gained enormous power and popular support as a result. In fact,
there wasn’t tremendous separation between epistemic power of the
judge and the force-backed power of the sult n’s cabinet: before the
Maml ks, chief judge Ibn Bint al-A azz exerted great power as both vizier

37. Id. at 53 (citing MAQR Z , KIT B AL-SUL K, supra note 29, 1:472; IBN ABD ALHIR 182 ( Abd al- Az z al-Khuwaytir ed., Riyadh 1976); Nielsen,
supra note 27, at 169 (citing IBN KATH R, BID YA, 13:234; MAQR Z , SUL K, 1:472, and
noting that the Hanbal s—given their small numbers—were not full deputies but instead were charged with overseeing registry of contracts as qids).
38. Jackson, supra note 19, at 53.
39. Regional schools gave way to official schools, that—like the anaf school did
starting in the ninth century—received state patronage. See, e.g., NURIT TSAFRIR, THE
HISTORY OF AN ISLAMIC SCHOOL OF LAW: THE EARLY SPREAD OF ANAFISM
(ILSP/Harvard Univ. Press 2004); Maribel Fierro, Proto-Malikis, Malikis, and Reformed
Malikis in Al-Andalus, in THE ISLAMIC SCHOOL OF LAW: EVOLUTION, DEVOLUTION, AND
PROGRESS 57–76 (ILSP/Harvard Univ. Press, 2005). For an earlier history of more varied law schools, see MATHIEU TILLIER, L’INVENTION DU CADI: LA JUSTICE DES
MUSULMANS, DES JUIFS ET DES CHRETIENS AUX PREMIERS SIECLES DE L’ISLAM
(Publications de la Sorbonne 2017); MATHIEU TILLIER, LES CADIS D’IRAQ ET L’ETAT
ABBASSIDE (132/750–334/945) (Institut Français du Proche-Orient 2009). Less studied is the extent to which judges developed and applied regional precedents that
sometimes differed in application from the more general laws of local jurists. For a
preliminary study in the context of property law, see Intisar A. Rabb, The Curious Case of
Bughaybigha, 661–883: Land and Leadership in Early Islamic Societies, in JUSTICE AND
LEADERSHIP IN EARLY ISLAMIC COURTS 23–46 (Intisar A. Rabb & Abigail Krasner
Balbale eds., ILSP/Harvard Univ. Press 2017).
Z HIR, AL-RAW AL-
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and chief judge under the prior (Ayy bid) regime.40 So jurists generally,
and this judge and jurist in particular, had enormous power and legitimacy alike.
So by the time our case unfolds in 1265, Sult n Baybars was already
primed to make reforms that would weaken the power of the chief judge.
Thus it is clear that the case was only a proximate cause or pretext for a
desired set of reforms. In its aftermath, the sultan in fact imposed three
significant changes on the structure of the judiciary. I have already mentioned the first: he elevated the deputies to chief judges so that a representative from each school presided alongside the Sh fi chief judge.41
Second, the sultan required judges to impose the majority opinion of
their schools, divergence from which was grounds for removal from the
judgeship.42 Third, he used the courts, as did judges themselves and ordinary petitioners, to secure desired outcomes by directing certain cases
to school-affiliated courts with legal norms in line with the petitioners’
own preferences.43
C. The Significance and Aftermath
Sult n Baybars’s reform of the judiciary is the most debated episode
in the history of courts in the Islamic world since the Abb sid caliph
H r n al-Rash d first introduced the office of chief judge almost five hundred years earlier. Medieval sources mark the event as momentous, with
chroniclers from that period offering a number of explanations. Some
suggest that the sult n’s desire to overturn the case of the disputing heirs
was the sole cause of the reform, and others point to factors involving migration, school partisanship, and foreign wars. Contemporary legal historians have offered their own interpretations of these sources, assessing the
explicit claims in the medieval sources against evidence of the major political, social, and legal developments of the time. But all told, legal historians in this field agree that domestic-facing factors prompted a need for
the judicial restructuring in ways that altered the balance of power between various institutions, and formed a new symbiosis between them.
They focus on the institutions themselves and the ways in which the legal
schools expanded or contracted in interactions with one another and
with the sultan’s government. But none have paid close attention to the
legal canons that emerged as a new genre precisely that time, as a result
of the reform. That is the untold—but all important for the history of interpretation—story of the aftermath of the reform, to which we will not
turn.

40.
41.
42.
the Maml
43.

Nielsen, supra note 27, at 172.
Jackson, supra note 19, at 53.
Yossef Rapoport, Legal Diversity in the Age of Taql d: The Four Chief Q d s under
ks, 10 ISLAMIC L. & SOC’Y 210, 216 (2003).
Id. at 221–26.
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III. COURTS AND CANONS IN ORDINARY TRIBUNALS, 1265–1350
One way of understanding the effects of the judicial reform on
Maml k-era Islamic law is to examine its effects on the operation of the
courts. In the wake of the reform, the courts saw new roles for the chief judges and their aides, they saw significant changes to the scope of their own jurisdiction in various subject areas (think: tax courts for some schools, and
family courts for others), and—importantly—they orchestrated tremendous changes in Islamic law as represented in the creation and use of an
entirely new genre of legal literature: collections of legal canons.
A. Judicial Roles: The Chief and his Aides
1.

The Chief Judge: Limited Judicial Powers

As for judicial role, the chief judges of each school enjoyed powers to
define jurisdiction and legal doctrine in their respective schools of law.44
Sul n Baybars’s new quadruple judiciary had achieved its main aim: reducing the Sh fi chief q ’s outsized power and tasking judges with a
more straightforward administration of Islamic law.45 Prior to the reform,
the Sh fi chief judge was able to review other judges’ decisions, all of
whom were technically his deputies, through a process of registration
(tasj l), before entering them into the judicial register (d w n al-hukm) for
enforcement.46 That he could use registration to confirm or reject other
judges’ rulings was typical of an earlier, hierarchical judiciary of one chief
and many deputies—the latter operating with derivative authority from
the former.47 Moreover, with his prior positions spanning executive and
judicial arenas, the Sh fi chief judge had presided over a large volume of
cases, and could readily dismiss any deputy judge who had not been appointed by the sultan directly.48
The reform’s elevation of deputy judges to chiefs from the three other schools, appointed directly by the sultan, brought about a system of two
44. JOSEPH H. ESCOVITZ, THE OFFICE OF Q AL-QU T IN CAIRO UNDER THE
BA R MAMLÛKS 131–72 (Klaus Schwarz Verlag 1984); see also PETRY, supra note 16, at
231–41.
45. ESCOVITZ, supra note 44, at 131.
46. Jackson, supra note 19, at 59–61. For a general description of early judges’
preservation practices, see Wael Hallaq, The “Q di’s D w n (Sijill)” before the Ottomans, 61
BULLETIN SCHOOL ORIENTAL & AFRICAN STUDS. 415–436 (1998) (recording a sample
registration form document in the Appendix).
47. ESCOVITZ, supra note 44, at 61–62; Jackson, supra note 19.
48. ESCOVITZ, supra note 44, at 175 (on viziers); Jackson, supra note 19, at 61–63
(citing writings on tasj l by Shih b al-D n al-Qar f (d. 684/1285), Ibn al- A r (d.
724/1323), Ibn R shid (d. ca. 731/1330), Ibn Farh n (d. 799/1396), and an opinion
in the Fat w Sul n al- Ulam al- Izz b. Abd al-Sal m, by the leader of the Sh fi school
at the start of Maml k rule, affirming the position that chief judges were permitted to
overrule the opinions of their deputies). Jackson notes that Hanaf s such as Al ’ al-D n
al- ar buls (d. 844/1440) opined that a principal judge was obliged to enforce the rulings of a deputy even if it went against his own school. Id. at 62
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types of judges for each school: multiple principals (chief judges) and
deputies (ordinary judges).49 Many came from the core of shaykhs—
those who headed religio-academic institutions, especially the madrasa.50
Chief judges earned the title of shaykh al-Isl m, and it was a regular occurrence for deputies to hold titles of shaykh and judge simultaneously.51
The authority with which the deputy judges acted derived epistemically
from their educational acumen and operationally from their respective
chief judges, who could reserve the right to review deputies’ opinions only within their own schools.52 The leading chief judge could no longer
reject or overrule decisions that were properly formulated according the
majority opinion of each school. His docket thus shrank in number and
subject matter, and his ability to dismiss judges became more limited.53
More generally, the Sh fi chief judge was charged with ensuring
that the quadruple judiciary functioned properly, along three main axes.54 First, he was to enforce valid judgments from all schools—which Ibn
Bint al-A azz had previously refused to do.55 As Maml k-era legal historian Yossef Rapoport put it, “ironically, it was now the responsibility of the
Sh fi Chief Q
to see to the correct observance of M lik or anbal
law.”56 Second, the chief judge was to help designate—in tandem with
royal decrees from the sultan—appropriate tribunals in which certain
cases could be brought.57 To better accord with executive or judicial
preferences, the chief could refer cases involving certain matters to courts
whose school’s laws aligned with a particular executive policy or preference.58 Third, and essential to ensuring the first two duties, the chief was
to ensure adherence to royal decrees requiring that each court follow the
majority rulings of their respective schools—given the internal diversity of
opinions within each school.59 It is this third duty, I argue, that had the
49. JACKSON, supra note 16, at 65.
50. See PETRY supra note 16, at 221 (noting that the term covered the heads of
Sufi kh nq hs and hospices as well, for which shaykhs exercised “legal responsibility for
a spiritual community”). On the operation of the madrasas, see further JONATHAN P.
BERKEY, THE TRANSMISSION OF KNOWLEDGE IN MEDIEVAL CAIRO: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF
ISLAMIC EDUCATION (Princeton Univ. Press 1992).
51. See PETRY, supra note 16, at 221.
52. JACKSON, supra note 16, 65.
53. Rapoport, supra note 42, at 226.
54. Id. at 217.
55. JACKSON, supra note 16, at 145.
56. Rapoport, supra note 42, at 217 (also noting that: “While serving as Sh fi
Chief Q
in Damascus, Taq al-D n al-Subk prohibited a Hanbal deputy from dissolving a marriage (faskh) in a manner that was considered weak by the majority of anbal
jurists. Al-Subk also refused to uphold the rulings of a deputy by the name of Ibn
Bukhaykh (d. 749/1347–8), a student of Ibn Taymiyya, after the anbal Chief Q
could not confirm that Ibn Bukhaykh’s judgments were in accord with established
Hanbal doctrine.”).
57. Id.
58. Examples are outlined infra Part III.B, notes 120–150 and accompanying text.
59. Rapoport, supra note 42, at 217. For a description of his other duties and of
his dress, see A MAD B. AL AL- QALQASHAND , SELECTIONS FROM UB AL-A SH BY AL-
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most far-reaching effects over the form and content of Islamic law expressed in each school: the schools came to detail or “codify” their substantive legal doctrines and interpretive principles in new works of legal canons.60
2.

Legal Canons Definitions

So what are legal canons? Legal canons are succinct statements of interpretive principles that express varied conceptions of law and its values,
and they are designed to aid in applying laws to specific facts. To be sure,
legal canons did not emerge after Baybars’s reform. Most of these canons
existed before the Maml ks, first announced in works of ad th, fatw s,
and narratives of judicial decisions, among other works of law and history.
Jurists of the Maml k era mostly identified the legal canons from prior
cases and works of law. For the first time, en masse and school-by-school,
they collected them as independent works put in dialog with one another
in lockstep with the dialogues on substantive law and court cases.
Now, how do Muslim jurists define legal canons?61 For them, Islamic
legal canons are interpretive principles reflecting changing conceptions
of Islamic law and its values, as they developed over time and space.
Scholars of Islamic law, both medieval and modern, typically define these
legal canons narrowly, as “text-based principles used to apply general Islamic
laws to particular cases.”62 A broader notion that I have argued accounts
for their sometimes extratextual origins and functional use shows canons
also to be “interpretive tools [that judges and jurists use] to construct Islamic law’s institutions . . . and to promote certain values or policies over others.”63
For example, a famous “universal” legal canon articulates a general policy—applicable to many areas of Islamic law—that the law should inflict or
allow “no harm and no retaliatory infliction of harm.” Judges could use
this no harm canon to evaluate contested individual and executive actions,
against community values or individual rights, as they collectively defined
QALQASHANDI, CLERK OF THE MAMLUK COURT: EGYPT: “SEATS OF GOVERNMENT” AND
“REGULATIONS OF THE KINGDOM”, FROM EARLY ISLAM TO THE MAML KS 153–55 (Heba
El-Toudy & T riq Jal l Abd al-Ham d eds., Routledge 2017).
60. For further discussion of legal canons works, see infra notes 127–32 and accompanying text.
61. This Section draws on my lengthier introduction to legal canons in Intisar A.
Rabb, Interpreting Islamic Law through Legal Canons, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF
ISLAMIC LAW 221–54 (Khaled Abou El Fadl, Ahmad Atif Ahmad, & Said Fares Hassan
eds., Routledge 2019).
62. See, e.g., YA Q B B. ABD AL-WAHH B B USAYN, AL-QAW ID, AL-FIQHIYYA: ALMAB DI , AL-MUQAWWIM T, AL-MA DIR, AL-DAL LIYYA, AL-TA AWWUR 22 (Maktabat alRushd 1998) (al-amr al-kull yan abiq alayhi juz iyy t kath ra tufham a k muh minh
(quoting T j al-D n Ibn al-Subk )). Cf. NECMETTIN KIZILKAYA, LEGAL MAXIMS IN
ISLAMIC LAW 15-25 (Brill 2021) (collecting and evaluating definitions of legal canons);
Wolfhart Heinrichs, Qaw id as a Genre of Legal Literature, in STUDIES IN ISLAMIC LEGAL
THEORY (Bernard Weiss ed., Brill 2002).
63. Rabb, supra note 61, at 221.
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them, violation of which would constitute “harm.”64 A contract law norm
stipulates that “Muslims must honor contractual conditions.” This contractual condition canon similarly announced the value that the collective juristic community placed on commerce and private contract.65 A famous and
widespread canon of criminal law, which I have elaborated elsewhere at
length, requires judges to “avoid criminal punishments in cases of
doubt.”66 Jurists and judges alike defined the ambit of this doubt canon to
signal values in presuming innocence, requiring clear statements of criminal laws before punishment (in analyses resembling the modern legality
principle) and narrowing the institutional authority to legitimately define
crime and punishment as they sought to stymie excessive punishment in
the ordinary courts in light of the rampant punishment in executive
courts.67
Numbering in the thousands (or tens of thousands?), these and other Islamic legal canons arose and were implemented during Islam’s
founding period, long before jurists began recording them in separate
treatises under the new Maml k system.68 Founding period legal canons
spanned the gamut of questions of Islamic law, as they continued to do,
and they appeared in a wide range of sources for Islamic law and judicial
practice: works of substantive law, legal theory, judicial procedure manuals, biographical dictionaries, historical chronicles, literary works, and
more.69
All in all, medieval Muslim jurists viewed these canons, I argue, as a
kind of interpretive precedent: a shorthand for persuasive statements of law
that did not need the backing of or grounding in a specific text or single
case to be authoritative. They were authoritative because they encapsulated the collective wisdom of many cases and controversies over time.
Importantly, Maml k scholars after the reform collected these canons
school-by-school, and they saw in these canons tools that could play a new
pedagogical and judicial function under the new structure following the

64. See MECELLE [OTTOMAN CIVIL CODE] OF 1869, ART. 29 (L arar wa-l dir r);
see also MU AMMAD IDQ B. A MAD B RN , 1 MAWS AT AL-QAW ID AL-FIQHIYYA 32
(D r al-Ris la al- lamiyya, 3rd ed. 2015); N IR MAK RIM-SH R Z , AL-QAW ID ALFIQHIYYA 16, 25 (Madrasat al-Im m Al ibn Ab T lib 2005); UB
MA MA N ,
FALSAFAT AL-TASHR 237–39 (D r al- Ilm lil-Mal y n, 5th ed. 1980). Of many monographs on this canons, see, e.g., MU AMMAD B QIR AL- ADR, L ARAR WA-L IR R (D r
al- diq n 2000); H B AMD GHAYTH, AL-Q IDA AL-DHAHABIYYA F AL-MU MAL T ALISL MIYYA: L ARAR WA-L IR R INDA AL- FI IBN RAJAB AL- ANBAL (D r al-Kit b alArab 1990).
65. See B RN , supra note 64.
66. See RABB, supra note 21, at 4 and passim.
67. See id. at 185–228.
68. See id.
69. See Intisar A. Rabb & Bilal Orfali, Islamic Law in Literature: Some Contributions
from Q d Tan kh , in TRADITION AND RECEPTION IN ARABIC LITERATURE: ESSAYS
DEDICATED TO ANDRAS HAMORI 189–205 (Margaret Larkin & Jocelyn Sharlet eds.,
Harrassowitz 2019).
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reforms. Through citation and use of these canons, jurists and judges
subtly informed the laws expressed in each school and in the courts.
3.

Types of Canons

In attempt to cover both medieval and modern internal approaches
as well as historical-interpretive approaches, my own work outlines a
scheme of five categories of legal canons: substantive, interpretive, procedural, governance, and structural canons.70 The first two categories track
the classical, internal divisions of substantive and interpretive canons.
Substantive canons often restate basic general principles of Islam’s substantive law (fiqh), and further provide guidance about the majority rule within a particular school on varied questions of law that are typically disputed
even within a single school.71 As labeled by medieval and subsequent jurists, substantive canons comprise the universal, general, and specific
canons.72 Universal legal canons are the five principles on which all schools
agree, both Sunn and Sh , to provide guide posts for any substantive law
question:
1. Harm is to be removed: al- arar yuz l.
2. Custom is legally authoritative: al- da mu akkama.
3. Hardship requires accommodation [of strict legal rules]: almashaqqa tajlibu al-tays r.
4. Certainty is not superseded by doubt: al-yaq n l yaz lu bi’lshakk.
5. Acts are to be evaluated according to their aims: al-um r bimaq idih .73
General legal canons form the bulk of the substantive canons category,
and they often restate settled norms in areas as disparate as ritual law,
commercial law, and criminal law. A general canon can restate a “declaratory” legal ruling, which speaks to the validity of a transaction or status
relationship.74 An example is the commercial law canon that stipulates
70. See RABB, supra note 21.
71. See Rabb, supra note 61, at 228–30.
72. See id. at 228.
73. See, e.g., MUHAMMAD AL-HUSAYN L K SHIF AL-GHIT , 1 TAHR R AL-MAJALLA
129–32, 139–42, 153–6 (Mu ammad Mahd al- if & Muhammad al-S id eds., alMajma al- lam lil-Taqr b Bayna al-Madh hib al-Isl miyya 2001–2) (providing critical
commentary on Mecelle articles 2, 4, 17, 19 and 36); AB ABD ALL H MU AMMAD b.
MU AMMAD AL-MAQQAR , QAW ID 198–212 (Ahmad b. ‘Abd All h b. Ham d ed.,
J mi at Umm al-Qur 1980); IBN NUJAYM, 1 AL-ASHB H WA L-NA IR 17–19 (Muhammad Mut al- fiz ed. 1983); AL-F IL AL-MIQD D AL-SUY R , NA AD AL-QAW ID ALFIQHIYYA AL MADHHAB AL-IM MIYYA 90–114 ( Abd al-Lat f al-K hkamar Mahm d alMar ash ed., Maktabat yat All h al- Uzm al-Mar ash 1982–3). For other divisions, see,
e.g., JAL L AL-D N AL-SUY , AL-ASHB H WA L-NA IR 35, 201, 299, 337 (Muhammad
al-Mu ta im bill h al-Baghd d ed., D r al-Kit b al- Arab 1998); MAK RIM-SH R Z , supra note 64, 1:26–7 (outlining five categories).
74. For the distinction between declaratory legal rulings (a k m wad iyya) and
injunctive legal rulings (a k m takl fiyya), see ROY P. MOTTAHEDEH, LESSONS IN
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that “a defective condition does not void a contract.” This canon helps
judges and jurists opine on contracts as if they are complete, even if there
is doubt about whether each contractual element is fulfilled.75 Or, a general canon can restate an “injunctive” law, which details the obligation,
prohibition, or some other normative status for a particular act—namely,
on a scale of obligatory, encouraged, permissible (legal), discouraged, or
prohibited (illegal). For example, an intoxicant canon states that “every
intoxicant is prohibited.”76 As the Qur n only explicitly prohibits wine,
this canon guides a judge or jurist in determining the legal status of nonwine intoxicants and might lead them to the conclusion—as it did for all
but early anaf jurists—that a beer-like drink called nab dh is prohibited.77 Finally for this substantive canons group, specific legal canons (also
referred to as aw bi ) are subject-specific restatements and presumptions
of majority positions that qualify the general canons. For example, a paternity canon specifies that, in paternity disputes, “the child belongs to the
marital bed.”78 To be sure, Islamic family laws provide that sexual intimacy is legal only within the confines of marriage, and Islamic criminal law
lays out penalties for fornication and adultery. Yet, there are times when
evidence of either will be lacking or for which one party will raise some
doubt. In such instances, this canon operates as a presumption that helps
judges resolve paternity claims with respect to the known marital relationship of the mother of the child, notwithstanding any dispute.79
Interpretive canons guide jurists on how to parse foundational texts
when devising legal rulings, and they help both judges and jurists interpret the law and the facts when issuing opinions on novel legal questions
in response to individual petitions or court cases. This category includes
textual canons, source-preference canons, and extrinsic-source canons.80
Textual canons instruct judges and jurists on how to interpret the Qur n,

ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE (English Translation of Dur s f ilm al-u l by Mu ammad
B qir A - adr) (Oneworld 2003).
75. See, e.g., MU AMMAD HASAN AL-BUJN RD , 4 AL-QAW ID AL-FIQHIYYA 189
(Mahd al-Mihr z & Muhammad Husayn al-Dir yt eds., Dal l-i M 2003–4) (al-shar al-f sid
laysa bi-mufsid lil- aqd).
76. See, e.g., B RN , supra note 64, at 38 (kull muskir har m). Cf. BUJN RD , supra
note 75, at 5:307 (kull muskir m i bi l-a la fa-huwa najis).
77. See RABB, supra note 21; NAJAM HAIDER, THE ORIGINS OF THE SH A: IDENTITY,
RITUAL, AND SACRED SPACE IN EIGHTH-CENTURY K FA 139–141 (Cambridge Univ. Press
2011) (discussing nab dh and other intoxicating substances).
78. See, e.g., Elizabeth Urban, The Identity Crisis of Ab Bakra: Mawl of the Prophet,
or Polemical Tool, in THE LINEAMENTS OF ISLAM: STUDIES IN HONOR OF FRED MCGRAW
DONNER 121–149 (Paul Cobb ed., Brill 2012); Uri Rubin, “Al-Walad li-l-Fir sh”: On the
Islamic Campaign against “Zin ,” 78 STUDIA ISLAMICA 5 (1993). For further references
to and discussion of this “paternity canon,” see RABB, supra note 21, at 119 nn. 54–55,
353–54 and accompanying text.
79. Almost a dozen scholars have commented on the origins and applications of
this canon—most recently in HARALD MOTZKI, AD TH: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENTS,
xiv (Ashgate 2004). For other references see Rabb, supra note 61, at 248–49 n.74.
80. See Rabb, supra note 61, at 231–34.
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had th, and other texts from Islam’s early founding period. For example,
the literal meaning canon simply instructs interpreters to “adopt the literal
(or ordinary) meaning over the figurative unless there is an indication to
do otherwise.”81 Source-preference canons help judges and jurists choose
which of multiple, conflicting sources that address the same legal question to prioritize. For instance, one canon instructs on privileging “foundational texts over interpretive rules” and another places “priority on custom over contract.”82 Each of these canons directs interpreters to the
source that they should consider to the exclusion of the conflicting
source. Extrinsic-source canons refer to extratextual sources—that is, general presumptions and tie-breakers—that help jurists avoid absurd results
or no results at all might otherwise arise from applying the plain texts literally.83 These sorts of canons give form to the equitable principles that
appears in Sunn jurisprudential manuals, such as the consideration of
public interest, equity, or custom (ma la a, isti s n, and urf, respectively).
Consider, for example, the canon stipulating that there is “no bar on
changes in legal rulings with changes in the times,” which is meant to allow jurists to update the law to accommodate social-cultural or structuraleconomic changes that typically fall outside of the four corners of legal
analysis, all things being equal.84
Related to, and sometimes conflated in the sources with, the first two
categories are procedural canons. These canons are well-recognized principles of judicial administration and cover canons of evidence, judicial procedure, and judicial conduct.85 The quintessential evidentiary canon that
governed proceedings in all ordinary courts stipulates that “the burden of
proof is on the claimant and the respondent may swear an oath of denial.”86 Some judicial procedure canons restated norms in an era in which
matters of personal status—which posed essential jurisdictional and substantive law questions in medieval Islamic courts—affected evidence and
outcomes. Generally read as limiting the application of non-Muslim testimony, one such canon provides that “non-Muslim testimony is accepted
for cases only involving non-Muslims.”87 Judicial conduct canons, perhaps
the least developed of this group, regulate the behavior of judges and
specify, for example, when a judge may be required to consult an expert

81. See, e.g., TASHKIR ET AL., supra note 58, at 28–31.
82. See, e.g., B RN , supra note 64, at 39; MAHMASANI, supra note 64, at 225–26;
TASHKIR ET AL., supra note 58, at 425–75.
83. On presumptions and tiebreakers, see generally Adam M. Samaha, On Law’s
Tiebreakers, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1661 (2010); ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION, supra note 14, at 153.
84. See MASHMAS N , supra note 64, at 233; BUJN RD , supra note 75, at 9.
85. Rabb, supra note 61, at 234–36.
86. See MECELLE, supra note 64, art. 76 (al-bayyina al al-mudda wa l-yam n al
man ankar).
87. See, e.g., MU AMMAD B. KHALAF B. HAYY N WAK , AKHB R AL-QU T 481 (Sa d
Mu ammad al-Lahh m ed., lam al-Kutub 2001).
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jurist on a complex case or when a judge can be removed from his position “for cause.”88
More than the others, the last two categories of governance canons and
structural canons explicitly reflect the varied mechanisms deployed for
regulating or updating relations between institutions of law and governance. Governance canons apportioned institutional responsibilities among
the principal actors in societies like that of the Maml ks when there was
no known constitution or law to do so definitively.89 One clear example is
a canon that places jurisdiction in the executive tribunals to resolve contested issues of criminal law: “it is for the im m to determine the extent of
discretionary penalties in proportion to the severity of the crime.”90 Another canon provides a default rule that allocates private wealth to the
public-executive treasury, for inheritance cases in which a judge can find
no will: “whoever dies with no will and no heirs [i.e., intestate], his money
goes to the public.”91 For their part, structural canons provided vehicles
for judges to deploy interpretation to allocate judicial power and to affirmatively frame the boundaries of the juristic-religious as distinct from
political institutions. A prime example is the finality canon—which stipulates that “a decision based on a judicial interpretation cannot be reversed simply by a different interpretation.”92 This canon is structural because judges use it to pronounce that a court that has opined on a case, as
a structural matter in a regime of multiple courts, has the final say.
Without a top-down mandate recognizing or requiring them, these
legal canons nevertheless played a tremendous role in Islamic legal interpretation, common-law style, since its inception in the seventh century.93
From Islam’s founding period through the tenth century, the earliest
available sources show that judges and jurists regularly cited and used legal canons in decision making, even when they could not trace them back
to Islam’s texts.94 In fact, so insistent and assured of the validity of these
legal canons were the jurists and judges using them that they sometimes
converted them into foundational texts—even where clear evidence was
lacking, and sometimes to the chagrin of their more textualist peers.
That is, with the ascendancy of textualism as the accepted method in the
tenth century, many scholars later attributed a prophetic source to core

88. See infra note 122 and accompanying text (reporting Ibn Far n’s stipulations
for judicial conduct).
89. See Rabb, supra note 61, at 236–37.
90. See B RN , supra note 64, at 1:52–53.
91. See id. at 1:52.
92. See MECELLE, supra note 64, art. 16 (al-ijtih d l yunqad bi-mithlih).
93. One is reminded of Richard Posner’s observation to his opening salvo in the
modern U.S. canon wars; namely, that the canons are here to stay. See Posner, supra
note 1, at 801. Cf. John F. Manning, Legal Realism and the Canons’ Revival, 5 GREEN BAG
2d 283-295 (2002).
94. See Rabb, supra note 61, at 227.
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legal canons.95 To be sure, some legal canons are reported in ad th collections of prophetic statements and in Qur nic verses.96 But they appear much more widely in fiqh treatises, historical chronicles, and other
sources of Islam’s first three centuries in ways show their ubiquity in interpreting Islamic law without always (much less often, in the earliest periods) referring to a textual source.97
B. Origins of Legal Canons as Judicial Norms: In Madrasas and Courts
Medieval Muslim jurists seem to have first recognized a need for or
value in systematizing and examining the legal canons independently in
the tenth and eleventh centuries in Baghdad, Central Asia, and Andalusia—such that it would be inaccurate to suggest that the impetus to systematize legal canons first occurred to Maml k jurists. The earlier scholars operated in an era of a different sort of systematization: of substantive
law, jurisprudence, and for that matter, theology, grammar, and literary
anthology. Concerning legal canons during that period, they wrote introductory works about them in fits and starts in most of the Sunn
schools.98 But with the changes to the legal system under the Maml ks—
the judicial reform and entrenchment then systematization of four
schools of law within it—legal canons as a separate and important genre
took on a life of their own.
After the judicial reform, the literature on legal canons expanded
exponentially to meet the new needs of judges and jurists in the new
Maml k justiciary. With the structural changes in 663/1265, the “regime
of legal pluralism” had the potential for descending into chaos—that is, if
judges from one legal school were to operate without respect to their
counterparts in others and had no methods for handling conflicts of
laws.99 Judges needed guidance on the substantive laws and procedures
applicable in their own courts, as well as that of other schools. This need
spurred leading jurists to write voluminous works setting out to record
95. The dispute about textualism and method accompanied the authenticityinterrogation and systematization of works of had th, substantive law (fiqh), and jurisprudence (u l al-fiqh). RABB, supra note 21, at 56–59, 243–57. For further discussion
of their varied origins, see Rabb, supra notw 61, at 222–27.
96. Rabb, supra note 61, at 222.
97. Id. at 222; RABB, supra note 21, at 48–59.
98. Pre-Maml k collections include AB AL-HASAN AL-KARKH (d. 340/952),
US L, published with UBAYD ALL H B. UMAR AL-DAB S (d. 430/1039), TA S S AL-NA AR
(D r Ibn Zaydun & Cairo: Maktaba al-Kulliyyat al-Azhariyya, n.d.); ABD AL-WAHH B ALBAGHD D (d. 476/1083), AL-MAJM WA L-FUR Q [OR, AL-FUR Q AL-FIQHIYYA] (Jal l
M AL-BA L (d.
Al al-Qadhdh fi al-Juhan ed., D r al-Bu th 2003); and IBN AL-LA
before 510/1116), QAW ID ( Abd al-Kar m al-F il ed., al-Maktaba al- Asriyya 1998),
along with a few other collections that are reported in early bibliographical sources but
no longer extant; see also RABB, supra note 21, at 348–57, 243–57; Rabb, supra note 61,
at 227.
99. Talal Al-Azem, A Mamluk Handbook for Judges and the Doctrine of Legal
Consequences (Al-M gab), 63 BULLETIN D’ÉTUDES ORIENTALES 205 (2015).
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debates and ultimately to restate applicable laws: especially new manuals
of substantive law, judicial practice, and constitutional theory of the type
that Shih b al-D n al-Qar f had penned. Along the same lines, and even
more urgently, jurists of that period also inaugurated a new genre of legal
canons literature: as restatements of norms that had arisen in the judicial
manuals or in courts. These canons provided instruction for jurists-intraining and guidance to judges on the proverbial bench needing to both
implement majority-rule intra-school norms and operate with respect to
inter-school norms in the Maml k system of legal pluralism.100
1.

Leading Schools: Sh fi and M lik Innovation

I’ll focus on two schools to illustrate the life they took on. To illustrate the life that some of these canons took on, this section focuses on
the two schools that led the charge in legal canons-oriented interpretation in a new regime of legal pluralism. Sh fii contributions to the new
wave of legal canons literature was by far the most extensive of any other
legal school during the Maml k period—which stands to reason given
their place of prominence in the madrasas and judiciary alike. Jurists
within that school produced no less than six prominent works of legal
canons that came to be of enduring relevance to Islamic law, even beyond
the Sh fi school.101
Unsurprisingly too, it was Izz al-D n b. Abd al-Sal m—the influential jurist, one-time Ayy bid chief judge, and teacher of the first Maml k
chief judge—who helped lay the groundwork. Although Sh fi use of legal canons had long preceded him,102 his is the first known, extant work
of legal canons of his school: Qaw id a k m f ma lih al- an m (Legal Canons on Rulings in the Best Interests of the People), also known as al-Qaw id alkubr (The Larger Work on Legal Canons) in contrast to his shorter work on
the same theme, al-Qaw id al- ugr .103 In summary terms, his work col-

100. Id. at 205. On Qar f 's works, including an analysis and translation of his
work on "constitutional jurisprudence," by Sherman Jackson and Mohammad Fadel,
respectively, see infra notes 107–113.
101. These core works include al- Izz b. Abd al-Sal m, al-Qaw id al-kubr ; Ibn
Wak l (d. 716/1317), al-Ashb h wa l-naz ir; Ibn al- Al (d. 761/1317) (attempting to
systematize the work by Ibn Wak l); T j al-D n al-Subk (d. 771/1370), al-Ashb h wa lna ir; Zarkash (d. 794/1392), al-Manth r f tartib al-qaw id al-fiqhiyya; and Suy (d.
911/1505), al-Ashb h wa l-na ir.
102. Although Sh fi himself had included legal canons in his fiqh treatises, the
Umm and the Ris la (see RABB, supra note 21, at 52–53), the first extant collections related to legal canons seems to be Shih b al-D n Ma m d b. A mad al-Zanj n (d.
al al-u l—which might be counted both as a
656/1258–9)’s Kit b Takhr j al-fur
work of “legal distinctions” and as a work of legal canons because he draws connections between fiqh rulings (fur ) or particular cases (juz iyy t) and their governing
principles in the u l, daw bi and qaw id literature to define differences between the
anaf and Sh fi madhhabs. See B RN , supra note 64, at 1:105.
103. For more on his life and writings, see Mariam Sheibani, Islamic Law in an
Age of Crisis and Consolidation: ‘Izz al-D n Ibn ‘Abd al-Sal m and the Ethical Turn in Medieval
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lected legal canons under the headline of a single principle: that all Islamic laws are “legislated” for the best interests of the people and to avoid
harm (jalb al-mas lih wa-d r al-maf sid).104 On his own account, all of
shar a, in the most expansive reading of Islamic law, is reducible to this
formulation. His purpose in writing the book was to clarify those interests
as they manifest in various laws to facilitate their execution, as well as to
provide guidance on handling acts of disobedience or violations of the
law.105 For him, were people to closely to examine Qur nic verses, for
example, they would conclude that any command is an encouragement to
an act or outcome that accrues to the benefit of the people, or a warning
against any act that would be to their detriment.106 He thus attempted
through this work to define the scope of human or public interest
(ma la a), typically a marginal or extralegal topic typically regarded as
within executive authority, to be instead squarely within the jurists’ purview to define Islamic law. He also noted a hierarchy of legal canons by
which this public interest could be achieved best.107 Notably, he wrote before or during Sul n Baybars’s takeover of power and the judicial reform;
and his appeal to this principle seemed an elevation of shar a above politics: he made no mention of the shifting political winds at the time. Nevertheless, he found staunch followers in his students who would expand
the work, as they sought to provide a basis for the legitimacy of this expanded range of Islamic law in a newly restructured system—regardless
whether explicitly mentioned—on public-interest grounds that the jurists
could now assert the prerogative to define. If Ibn Abd al-Sal m sought to
write a manual that set a standard for adjudication, he had a ready student in Ibn Bint al-A azz to enforce it—taking it from scholarly treatise to
judicial opinion.108
Ibn Abd al-Sal m’s most immediate influence, aside from Chief
Judge Ibn Bint al-A azz (who left no written record) was the prominent
M lik scholar and his student Shih b al-D n al-Qar f (d. 684/1285).
Together with students from diverse schools of law, Qar f had studied
under Ibn Abd al-Sal m at the prestigious li iyya Madrasa in Cairo, as
had his teacher before him, the M lik scholar Shar f al-Karak (d. 688 or
Islamic Law 212–337 (Dec. 2018) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation) (on file with the
University of Chicago).
104. IBN ABD AL-SAL M, AL-QAW ID AL-KUBR [AKA QAW ID AL-A K M F
MA LIH AL-AN M] (Naz h Kam l Hamm d & Uthm n Jumu a Dumayriyya eds., D r
al-Qalam 2000), passim. For further discussion, see B RN , supra note 64, at 105;
MAQQAR , AL-1QAW ID 134 (Ahmad b. Abd All h b. Ham d ed., J mi at Umm al-Qur
1980) (editor’s notes).
105. IBN ABD AL-SAL M, AL-QAW ID AL-KUBR , supra note 104, at 14.
106. Id.
107. See Mariam Sheibani, Innovation, Influence, and Borrowing in Mamluk-Era Legal
Maxim Collections, 140 J. AM. ORIENTAL SOC’Y, 927, 935 (2020).
108. Maml k chroniclers point to this jurist as responsible for appointment of his
student, the judge—either by requesting the appointment from Baybars or by responding to the sult n’s consultation to suggest it. JACKSON, supra note 16, at 66.
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689/1290–91).109 Qar f himself had never served as judge, even though
the li iyya Madrasa was a “feeder” school for the judiciary—perhaps because he was preoccupied more with teaching and writing than judging,
or perhaps because he lacked the political acumen to secure a judgeship.110 Indeed, he left a significant written legacy. Qar f wrote the book
Anw r al-bur q f anw al-fur q, more commonly referred to as Fur q
(“Legal Distinctions”), as a legal canons treatise that came in response to
and with heavy reliance on Ibn Abd al-Sal m’s work.111 He wrote that
treatise following completion of his two major works that laid the
groundwork for the legal canons book. The first was his take on institutional relations and legal authority, his statement of “constitutional jurisprudence,” al-I k m f tamy z al-fat w an al-a k m. Published in the midst
of Baybars’s judicial reforms, in it, he attempted to detail the scope of legitimate authority for issuing judicial decisions and for the executive or
discretionary orders issued by sultans and their deputies. The specific
impetus for the book was Ibn Bint al-A azz’s exclusionary policies, and
Qar f ’s work may well have guided the “corporate” tenor of the legal
schools’ subject-matter jurisdiction that characterized the period following the judicial reform.112 The second book was his magnum opus on all
aspects of M lik substantive law, al-Dhakh ra f fur al-M likiyya.113 He saw
his work on legal canons, Fur q, as an extension of his previous two major
works and as a way to facilitate the projects of reading and interpreting
Islamic law.
In his introduction to Fur q, Qar f explains that he incorporated the
legal canons peppered throughout his Dhakh ra, and organized them to
better aid the jurist or judge approaching interpretive questions. Whereas the legal canons before had been “scattered across the many chapters
on substantive law (fiqh), [in the Fur q] each legal canon [has] its own
chapter because individual rulings (fur ) are based on them.”114 It “occurred to him,” he says, almost as if by coincidence and as if he did not
notice that his teacher Ibn Abd al-Sal m had done similarly, to collect
the canons into a single work, provide a summary and explanation of
109. For his biography including the extent of his tutelage under Sh fi s, see
JACKSON, supra note 16, at 5–9; see also Sheibani, supra note 107, at 933.
110. JACKSON, supra note 16, at 14–15.
111. Qar f gave his book three alternative names: Anw r al-bur q f anw al-fur q,
Kit b al-Anw r wa l-anw , and al-Qaw id al-sunniyya f al-asr r al-fiqhiyya—the first of
which stuck. SHIH B AL-D N AL-QAR F , KIT B AL-FUR Q: ANW R AL-BUR Q F ANW
AL-FUR Q ( Al Jumu a & Mu ammad A mad Sir j eds., D r al-Sal m 2001), at 11. For
a detailed comparison of Qar f ’s borrowing, see Sheibani, supra note 107, at 933–34.
112. See JACKSON, supra note 16, at xix-xxi, xxvi, 12–16.
113. For a discussion of his two prior works, see QAR F , FUR Q, supra note 111,
at 8, 10. On the Tamy z, see JACKSON, supra note 16, at 16–19; MOHAMMAD H. FADEL,
CRITERION FOR DISTINGUISHING LEGAL OPINIONS FROM JUDICIAL RULINGS AND THE
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS OF JUDGES AND RULERS [translation of Al-Ihk m f tamy z al-Fat wá
an al-ahk m wa-tasarruf t al-Q d wa l-Im m by Shih b al-D n al-Qar f ] (Yale Univ. Press
2017).
114. QAR F , FUR Q, supra note 111, at 8.
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each, and spell out the principles underlying its resultant rulings to better
aid jurists or judges trying to make decisions about Islamic law in individual cases.115 For Qar f , legal canons are a core part of Islamic law’s interpretive methodology—so much so that he called it the second branch
of jurisprudence (u l al-fiqh) and declared that anyone trying to interpret laws without the aid of legal canons would fail; they would find themselves unable to operate according to principle or to navigate seeming
contradictions that could be resolved with a better understanding of Islam’s interpretive foundations and tools.116 Accordingly, he uses the
Fur q (“Distinctions”) to collect some 584 legal canons to aid those
charged with interpreting the law: the term “distinctions” merely refers to
seemingly divergent cases of legal canons (al-fur q bayna al-qaw id).117
Ibn Abd al-Sal m’s (d. 660/1262), Qaw id al-a k m f ma li al-an m
proved to be of enduring relevance in its own school as well.118 Sh fi s
following him wrote over three dozen treatises, commentaries, and summations of legal canons during the Maml k period alone.119 At least six
115. Id. at 8–9.
116. Id. at 6–7.
117. Id. at 11. For further discussion of definitions of legal canons and legal distinctions, see KIZILKAYA, supra note 56, at 25; ELIAS G. SABA, HARMONIZING
SIMILARITIES (Walter de Gruyter 2019); see also Sheibani, supra note 107, at 933;
Khadiga Musa, Legal Maxims as a Genre of Islamic Law: Origins, Development, and Significance of al-Qaw id al-Fiqhiyya, 21 ISLAMIC L. & SOC’Y 325, 325–65 (2014).
118. Recent years have seen at least four editions of this work published: (1) IBN
ABD AL-SAL M, QAW ID AL-A K M F MA LI AL-AN M (Naz h Kam l Hamm d &
Uthm n Jumu a Dam riyya, eds., 2nd ed. 2007); (2) A 2000 edition by the same editors and press; (3) IBN ABD AL-SAL M, QAW ID AL-A K M F MA LI AL-AN M ( h
Abd al-Ra f Sa d ed., 1968); (4) IBN ABD AL-SAL M, QAW ID AL-A K M F MA LI
AL-AN M (n.d.).
119. These works include a commentary on al- Izz Ibn Abd al-Sal m’s work by a
much later author Bulq n al- Asqal n (d. 805/1403), Faw id al- us mh al Qaw id Ibn
Abd al-Sal m (not extant), and several summaries of his work published variously as alQaw id al- ughr , al-Faw id f ikhti r al-maq sid, Mukhta ar al-Faw id f ahk m almaq id, or al-Faw id f mukhta ar al-Qaw id in 1988 and 1996. The period immediately after al- Izz Ibn Abd al-Sal m saw a continuous string of works throughout the
Maml k period: Ab al-Fa l Mu ammad b. Al b. al- usayn al-Khall (d. 675/1277–
8), Qaw id al-shar wa- aw bi al-a l wa l-far ; Nawaw (d. 676/1278), al-U l wa l-daw bi
(also called K. al-Qaw id wa al-daw bi f u l al-fiqh or Daw bi al-fu l) (listing some
nine matters about which jurists disagree); Ibn al-Wak l (d. 716/1317), al-Ashb h wa al(d. 761/1317), alnaw ir or al-na ir (discussing twenty-seven legal canons), Al
al-mudhhab f qaw id al-madhhab—followed by a series of commentaries and
Majm
summaries of it, including his own, Mukhtasar Qaw id al- Al , that of Sarkhad (d.
792/1390), Mukhta ar al-Majm al-mudhhab, Hi n (d. 829/1426), al-Qaw id—and Ibn
al- Al ’s, al-Ashb h wa'l-na ir f fur al-fiqh al-Sh fi —again followed by a number of
commentaries: Ibn al-H im (d. ca. 810/1412), Ta r r al-qaw id al- Al iyya wa-tamh d
al-mas lik al-fiqhiyya and his al-Qaw id al-man ma (with its own commentary by
Qab qab (d. 901/1496–7)), and Ibn Kha b al-Dahsha (d. 834/1431), Mukhta ar
Qaw id al- Al wa tamh d al-Asnaw . The prominent scholar T j al-D n al-Subk , Ibn
al-Subk (d. 771/1370) who wrote al-Ashb h wa al-na ir and his famous contemporary
Asnaw (d. 772/1370), wrote several additional works: al-Tamh d f istikhr j al-mas il alfur iyya min al-qaw id al-u liyya, Ma li al-daq iq f ta r r al-jaw mi wa al-faw riq,
Nuzhat al-naw ir f riy al-na ir, and a work also called al-Ashb h wa al-na ir—which
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Sh fi works following Ibn Abd al-Sal m’s model were to become of enduring importance, not only among Sh fi s but in Islamic law writ large.
The interest in and importance of the field continued through the end of
Maml k rule: the prominent Sh fi jurist Suy t (d. 911/1505), too,
wrote a version of al-Ashb h wa’l-na ir (a common title for legal canons
treatises from this period) that stands as a go-to source to this day. And
even before, their influence on other schools was extensive.
For their part, M lik jurists had a long prior history of legal canons
jurisprudence, supported by political patronage where their school dominated elsewhere. In the Islamic West, M lik s had long engaged in debating and deploying legal canons. Muhammad b. H rith al-Khushan (d.
361/981), included legal canons in his U l al-futy f al-fiqh al madhhab
al-Im m M lik, and it is regarded as the first M lik work of legal canons.120
Further, Q
Iy (d. 544/1149) wrote a book called al-Qaw id, and Ibn
al-H jib wrote Mukhta ar al-muntah al-u l , both of which are regarded
as works of legal canons.121 In the Islamic East, Abd al-Wahh b alattracted the aforementioned commentaries by Ibn Kha b al-Dahsha (d. 834/1431)
and arkhad (d. 792/1390) (who treated his book together with that of Ibn al- Al ).
A short time later, Badr al-D n Mu ammad b. Ab Bakr b. Sulaym n al-Bakr (d. after
772) wrote K. al-Istighn (or al-i tin ) f al-fur q al-istithn , and Sharaf al-D n al-Ghazz
(d 799/1397) wrote al-Qaw id f l-fur . In the same generation, the prominent scholar Zarkash (d. 794/1392), wrote al-Manth r f tart b al-qaw id al-fiqhiyya, which sparked
commentaries by Abb d (d. 947 or 941/1540-1), Shar Qaw id al-Zarkash and by
Sha r n (d. 973/1565), al-Maq id al-saniyya f al-qaw id al-fiqhiyya [or al-shar iyya];
Zarkash also wrote his own gloss on Qaw id al- Al and a work by the name of alQaw id f al-fur or al-Qaw id wa l-daw bi f al-fiqh. Ibn al-Mulaqqin al-Andalus (d.
804/1401) later wrote his version of an al-Ashb h wa al-na ir volume, and Mu ammad
b. Mu ammad al-Ghazz (d. 808/1405–6) wrote Asn al-maq id f ta r r al-qaw id. Subsequent works included F r z b d al-Sh r z (d. 817/1415), Qaw id al-a k m; Hisn (d.
829/1426) and Ibn Khat b al-Dahsha (d. 834/1431)’s commentaries on Ibn al- Al ’s
work (see above); as well as Shuqayr al-Maqdis (d. 876/1471–2), Na am al-dhakh ir f
l-ashb h wa l-na ir. The last, and most prominent, Sh fi scholar after Ibn Abd alSal m to author an influential work on legal canons came at the end of this period:
Suy
(d. 911/1505) in his al-Ashb h wa’l-na ’ir—which attracted commentaries by
Ibn al-Ahdal al-Yaman (d. 1035/1625), al-Far id al-bahiyya f al-qaw id al-fiqhiyya; F s
al-M lik (d. 1096/1685), al-B hir f ikhti r al-Ashb h wa’l-na ir; N in al-Im m (d.
1133/1720–21), H shiya al al-Ashb h wa’l-na ir; Ab Bakr b. Ab al-Q sim al-Ahdal
(d. 1053/1643-4), al-Far id al-bahiyya (which itself provided the basis for the commentary by Abd Allah b. Sulaym n al-Jurhaz al-Yaman (d. 1201/1787–8), al-Maw hib alsaniyya al al-Far id al-bahiyya, a supercommentary by Mu ammad Y s n b. s alF d n al-Makk (d. 1376/1957–8), al-Faw id al-janiyya shiyat al al-Maw hib alsaniyya, and a gloss by Abd All h b. Sa d Mu ammad Abb d al-La j al- a ram ,
al-Qaw id al-fiqhiyya. The next available work on legal canons—that did not in some
way rely on Suy ’s work—was not until Daml j (d. 1234/1819), Shar al-qaw id alkhams.
120. See, e.g., Maqqar , supra note 96, at 128 (editor’s notes); AL A MAD ALNADW , AL-QAW ID AL-FIQHIYYA 189 (Dar al-Qalam 1998).
Iy d (d. 544/1149)’s work was published in 1993 as Tart b al-mad rik
121. Q
wa-taqr b al-mas lik li-ma rifat a l m madhhab M lik (M. Bencherifa ed., Wiz rat al-Awq f
wa l-Shu n al-Isl miyya 1983). There is one known commentary from the Ottoman
period: Ibn al-Uqay i (d. 1001/1592–3), Sharh Qaw id al-Q d Iy , still in manuscript
form. See Maqqari, supra note 96, at 128 (editor’s notes).
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Baghd d (d. 476/1083) wrote al-Majm wa l-fur q—a reference to the
type of legal distinctions between legal canons that Qar f would popularize.122 These prior works preceded and informed Qar f ’s Fur q, allowing
him to claim that he was building on a firm M lik legacy, even as he was
influenced by the leading Sh fi jurist of his time.123 Following him were
several works of legal canons, mostly in the western Islamic world.124 Yet
by far, Qar f ’s Fur q remains the most well-known canons collection
among M lik s of his time and in the eastern Islamic world, and afterward
is rivaled perhaps only by books authored by Maqqar and Wanshar s ,
both of whom wrote from the Islamic West.
That Sh fi and M lik contributions were so plentiful was a product
of a number of factors, and when compared to the relative paucity of
their peers, begs the question: How and why were Sh fi s and M lik s so
important to the establishment of the new legal canons era? Several factors played a role, but there is one that I wish to emphasize aside from political patronage and prior history.
I suggest that the Maml k judicial reforms that brought on forum
shopping from above and below in the courts, in a new system of legal
pluralism, demanded clarity of both substantive and interpretive norms.
The clarity demanded implicated legal canons and created a new function for them. That is, legal canons provided an acceptable escape valve
to the pressure cooker of some of the rigidities of the new judicial structures. Case referral from one school’s court to another would not always
do the trick, especially among the Sh fi s, who espoused an otherwise
rigid textualist orientation. Recall that it was the first Sh fi chief judge’s

122. Muhammad al-R k published an edition of this work as al-Qaw id alfiqhiyya min khil l Kit b al-Ishr f al mas il al-khil f lil-Q Abd al-Wahh b al-Baghd d alM lik (D r al-Bu th lil-Dir s t al-Isl miyya wa-I y al-Tur th 2003). It contains
some 96 legal canons, including the 5 universal canons, 57 substantive legal canons, 4
interpretive canons, and 30 additional “mixed” canons.
123. It has been published independently by Markaz al-Dir s t al-Fiqhiyya wa lIqti diyya (Mu ammad A mad Sir j & Al Jumu a Muhammad eds. 2001); and toin his Idr r al-shur q al
gether with shiyat Umdat al-muhaqqiq n by Ibn al-Sh
anw al-fur q and on the margins of Tahdh b al-fur q wa l-Qaw id al-saniyya f al-asr r alfiqhiyya by Muhammad Al b. al-Shaykh Husayn (D r al-Ma rifa 1970). Several Maml kera M lik scholars commented on his work, most notably, Ab abd All h al-Baqq r
(d. 707/1307–08), Tart b Fur q al-Qar f or Mukhta ar Qaw id al-Qar f (al-M l d b.
Jumu a & al-Hab b b. T hir eds., Mu assasat al-Ma rif 2003)—as a summary and rearrangement of Qar f ’s collection, with some of his own editions and commentary; and
the Muft of Mecca, Mu ammad Al b. Husayn al-M lik (d. mid-8th/14th century),
Tahdh b al-Fur q.
124. See Ibn Juzayy al-Gharn (d. 741/1340), Qaw n n al-a k m al-shar iyya wamas il al-fur al-fiqhiyya (unpublished manuscripts: Rabat Ms. 160; Fez/Qar. Ms. 835;
2
Cairo Ms. 489 with the title al-Qaw n n al-fiqhiyya f talkh madhhab al-M likiyya; Tunis
Ms. 1341/4)); Ibn al-H jj al- Abdar (d. 737/1337–8), Kit b al-Qaw id (partially edited
in a dissertation) (on file with J mi at Umm al-Qur in Mecca as Ab Abd All h alMaqqar (d. 758/1357), Qaw id (Ahmad b. Abd All h b. am d ed., J mi at Umm alQur 1980)); IBN GH Z AL-MIKN S (d. 901/1496), KIT B AL-KULLIYY T AL-FIQHIYYA
WA L-QAW ID (Muhammad Ab al-Ajf n ed., n.d.).
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refusal to accommodate interpretations from the other schools that led to
the establishment of the quadruple judiciary.125 This new system and new
focus on clarifying Islamic law and its interpretive principles would manifest in a sizeable role for legal canons in definitions of Islamic law. Tellingly, for example, Sh fi’ s and M lik s were the only jurists in the new
system to promote the notion of “interpretive doubt” in criminal law applications of the doubt canon, which recognized that any ambiguity arising
from interpretations of law seen valid in one school was to be recognized
to avoid liability in any other school.126 In these and other circumstances,
their need to accommodate interpretations from schools outside of their
own led to their incorporation of a regime of legal pluralism—including
interpretive principles exemplified by legal canons.127
2.

How Did Legal Canons Operate?

How did legal canons operate in concrete terms? We saw them in the
chief judge’s advisory opinion in the case that inaugurated the judicial
reform. Were he in an ordinary court of Islamic law (rather than the
sult n’s court), he would have followed certain rules that made heavy use
of legal canons (and he drew on that context in offering his advice). In
the ordinary courts, once the court session started, the judge was to proceed with examining the claims and evidence. Importantly, the evidence
canon typically governed. As noted, that canon stipulates that the “petitioner bears the burden of proof, and the respondent to swear an oath of denial once
a claim is proved.”128 This canon required that, before looking at the evidence, the judge had to first determine who was the petitioner in order to
determine what evidence each party would be required to proffer.129
Once a judge had assigned to one litigant the status of petitioner, it
meant that the petitioner had to make out a prima facie case before the
judge would turn to the respondent. But that determination itself was a
matter of interpretation, which rested on other legal canons or presumptions. Recall from the case that the chief judge pointed to the presump125. Rapoport, supra note 42; JACKSON, supra note 16.
126. See RABB, supra note 21, at 205. Ibn Abd al-Sal m was the first to expand on
the categories of doubt in his Qaw id, supra note 104, at 2:279–80 in a legal canons
work; he was preceded in substantive law works by Ab
mid al-Ghaz l (d. 505/111),
al-Was f al-madhhab (A mad Ma m d Ibr h m & Muhammad Muhammad T mir
eds., D r al-Sal m, 1997), 6:443–44; Abd al-Kar m al-R fi (d. 623/1226), 11 alMu arrar f al-fiqh al-Sh fi 145–47 (Mu ammad Hasan Ism l ed., D r al-Kutub alIlmiyya 2005); and Nawaw (d. 676/1277), 7 Raw at al- lib n 306–12 ( dil Ahmad
Abd al-Mawj d & Al Muhammad Mu awwad eds., D r al-Kutub al- Ilmiyya 1992). For
further discussion see RABB, supra note 21, at 205 n.80.
127. RABB, supra note 21, at 205, 212–17.
128. See, e.g., WAK , supra note 87; MUWAFFAQ AL-D N IBN QUD MA, AL-MUGHN
AL MUKHTA AR AB AL-Q SIM AL-KHIRAQ 11 404 ( Abd All h b. Abd al-Muhsin alTurk & Abd al-Fatt Muhammad al- ulw eds., Hajar 1986).
129. See AB IS Q IBR H M B. AL B. MU AMMAD AL-YA MUR IBN FAR N,
TAB IRAT AL- UKK M 1 105–08 (Jam l Mar ashl ed., D r al-Kutub al- Ilmiyya 2001).
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tions of waqf over sale, possession over claims of ownership—unless evidence
was available to prove otherwise. That meant that, had that case been litigated in his court (rather than that of the sultan), the judge’s heirs would
have won by operation of these two legal canons. They claimed that their
father had formed a charitable trust before his death—which would make
them prevail. Moreover, by operation of the legal canon that the chief
judge was implicitly referencing, q idat al-yad (the possession canon—
which is itself contested), their possession of the property until the father’s death would prevail over claims of ownership. This made any party
arguing to the contrary the petitioners. By operation of the evidence
canon, the judge would impose on the petitioners a heavy burden of evidence to prevail. It was all but assured, it seems, that the judge’s heirs
were destined to win. This was so by virtue of the judge interpreting the
various texts and legal canons that formed the law and achieved the outcomes to which he was partial.
Islamic legal canons operated (or deliberately did not operate) in
other significant ways in the aftermath of the judicial reform. The reform
gave subject-matter jurisdiction to particular schools for particular types
of cases: for example, criminal laws where officials wanted to secure a
conviction typically went to M lik courts, and family laws to Hanbal
courts. Legal canons operated in each according to the judges and jurists
of that school’s adoption of certain legal canons over others.
We can see the consequences of this per-court-subject-matter jurisdiction clearly in high-profile blasphemy and other criminal cases. M lik
judges presided, as in the famous case by which Shahid I—the famous
Sh jurist who was executed in the late fourteenth century. The Sh fi
chief judge—now working with the sult n—would often use his power to
refer certain high-profile capital cases to M lik courts, because M lik s
espoused doctrines that would allow capital punishment without a period
for repentance. They did so through adopting some legal canons and rejecting others (such as the doubt canon that was rejected in the blasphemy
case). All other schools privileged that canon and therefore could not
support a capital conviction.
Sh fi chief judges routinely handed over blasphemy cases in which
they wanted to secure the death penalty to M lik courts. Yossef Rapoport
detailed several cases in the eighth/fourteenth century, from 701–797
AH. Of the twenty-six known blasphemy cases during that period in Cairo
and Damascus plus its outskirts, M lik courts handled eighteen of them—
all leading to execution; the four cases that resulted in acquittals were
handled by three Sh fi judges and one Hanaf judge.130
130. Rapoport, supra note 42, at 224 (Table 1). For further discussion of some of
the trials, see Stefan H. Winter, Shams al-D n Mu ammad Ibn Makk “Al-Shah d Al-Awwal”
(d. 1384) and the Sh ah of Syria, 3 MAML K STUDS. REV. 149 (1999); Lutz Weiderhold,
Blasphemy Against the Prophet Muhammad and His Companions (sabb al-ras l, sabb ala bah): The Introduction of the Topic into Sh fi Legal Literature and its Relevance for Legal
Practice Under Maml k Rule, 42 J. SEMITIC STUD. 39 (1997).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2022

29

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 5 [2022], Art. 1

860
3.

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66: p. 831

The Scope of Islamic Legal Canons

What are we to make of all this? Put simply, the reforms facilitated
three main changes in interpreting Islamic law—the first two of which
Rapoport has noted. First, they led to increased predictability of legal
outcomes through majority rule at the same time that they ensured flexibility of forum within a pluralistic legal system.131 Second, they allowed
executive officials (and, occasionally, the collective of jurists) to express
and implement certain policy preferences.132 And third, and this is what
is new, they led to developments in an early type of codification of legal
canons in Islamic law to fuel the new system. Judges (and other parties)
needed jurists to specify the majority substantive laws (legal rulings) as
well as the interpretive principles (legal canons) governing each court.
When experts in Islamic legal history discuss this period, they make it
clear that we know a lot about the increased activity in works of substantive law—both encyclopedic-fiqh books and summary restatementmukhtasars—during that period to fuel those efforts.133 They have yet to
chart the vast landscape of legal canons that emerged at the same time in
the same vein, for the same reasons. My broader work attempts to map
that landscape, a project over a historical and geographic span so vast that
it calls for data scientific tools for mapping.
* * *
Legal canons were not new under the Maml ks. All in all, their prevalence both before and after the advent of the judicial reforms of the thirteenth century shows as much. But legal canons as an independent genre of
authoritative principles of interpretation for each court and the explosive
growth of legal canons were new. Expansive writings on legal canons
grew out of the judicial reform and took shape as a common law of interpretive precedent. Drawing on judicial practice, leading jurists compiled
voluminous compendia of canons and carefully placed them in hierarchies of importance. As with the mukhtasar that provided restatements of
each school’s substantive laws, the legal canons compendia provided restatements of each school’s interpretive norms alongside its substantive
norms. These same compendia served as manuals for legal pedagogy
131. Rapoport, supra note 42, at 77.
132. Id. at 228 (“By authorizing q d s from different schools to follow their doctrine on specified points of law, the state indirectly intervened in a variety of social and
economic interactions. In the field of family law, for example, one can almost reconstruct a government policy in a sphere that has often been considered to be completely
beyond the reach of a pre-modern Islamic state. This policy included supporting stipulations n marriage contracts in favor of brides, allowing deserted wives to dissolve their
marriages, providing divorcees with marital support during their waiting period, and
marrying off minor orphans.”).
133. See id. at 216, 226. Cf. Mohammad H. Fadel, The Social Logic of Taqlid and the
Rise of the Mukhtasar, 3 ISLAMIC L. & SOC’Y 195 (1996).
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and—to pupils who became judges—once again, for judicial practice. To
be clear, the legal canons were not the direct output of an executiveimposed structure, as was the judicial reform. Nor were they taken to be
jurist-defined content, as was the substantive law. Rather, they were dynamic tools for interpretation. Jurists and judges played a role in constructing these canons, common-law style, especially in areas involving interpretation and procedure. They did so in response to ongoing cases
and controversies.
Generally, the history of cases from this period illustrate the complex
institutional dialectic that followed Sul n Baybars’s judicial reform and
the accompanying growth of legal canons. The case that led to the reform itself shows—rather counterintuitively—that the executive recognized the jurists’ power over defining the law and the judges’ power in
implementing it. This is counterintuitive because one might correctly
suppose that one impetus for the reform was to weaken the power of the
singular Sh fi chief judge on the bench and for the sultan to assert more
control. But the sultan’s method of doing so fit squarely within the ambit
of his executive power over judicial appointments as a part of administrative or public law (siy sa), rather than in the legal definition and interpretation of Islamic law as state or jurist-defined law (shar a). Yet, subsequent cases show how courts became sites of contestation among jurists
competing to define law and religious “orthodoxy,” and how judges in the
new structure could secure or avoid outcomes from the use of certain
courts and certain legal canons. In ways that changed over time.
More specifically, this history shows that Sh fi s and M lik s drew on
prior tradition once circumstances in Maml k rule pushed them to further systematize or “codify” these legal canons as school norms. Ibn Abd
al-Sal m’s and Shih b al-D n al-Qar f ’s works on legal canons were particularly significant to Maml k Islamic law because they inaugurated a
much broader trend that helped support the new teaching and judicial
systems. Following them was a veritable explosion of legal canons literature across all schools, including in both Sunn and Sh communities.
The presence and prevalence of legal canons alongside substantive law,
read against the backdrop of issues of law and society in the new Maml k
system, suggests that one cannot understand Islamic law and its accompanying structures without the legal canons.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article began with an observation that legal canons had made a
comeback, in the classroom and in the courtroom. This recent comeback
arose in American law as well as in Islamic law in roughly the same period—that is, over the last thirty or so years.134 And this Article has sought
134. The following discussion is adapted from my book chapter on Interpreting
Islamic Law, supra note 62, at 221–54.
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to contextualize that rise in the Islamic world through uncovering the history of interpretive practices that featured a thirteenth-century rise of legal canons as a genre of Islamic law.
Strikingly, the scholarly attention to Islamic legal canons in today’s
classroom has come in direct contrast to a judicial decline in the modern
courtroom in some twenty-nine Islamic constitutional states. For that reason, Muslim scholar-jurists who are aware of the existence and value of
legal canons have increasingly emphasized their importance for understanding Islamic law historically and perhaps adjusting Islamic laws to
contemporary times. In Sunni circles, most modern developments have
tended to emerge from scholars of M lik and Hanbal law.135 More recently, Sh fi s and Hanaf s have turned to the study of legal canons as
well.136 In Shi i circles, contemporary jurists have started to re-examine
the legal canons highlighted in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
(given their return to the rationalist approaches to legal interpretation)
with increased vigor in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.137 And
minoritarian schools have turned to the study of legal canons as well, including Ib d s and those interested in intra-school and inter-school com135. For M lik s, Mu ammad al-R k wrote al-Qaw id al-fiqhiyya min khil l Kit b
al-Ishr f al mas il al-khil f lil-Q d Abd al-Wahh b al-Baghd d al-M lik (D r al-Qalam
1998). Other important M lik works include: SA DAN B. A AL S LIM, TAYS R ALMAR JI WA L-MAD RIK LI-QAW ID MADHHAB AL-IM M M LIK: QIR A AD THA F
QAW ID AL-FIQH AL-M LIK (D r Y suf b. T shif n wa-Maktabat al-Im m M lik 2007);
DIL B. ABD AL-Q DIR B. MU AMMAD WAL Q TA, AL-QAW ID WA L- AW BI ALFIQHIYYA AL-QAR FIYYA: ZUMRAT AL-TAML K T AL-M LIYYA (D r al-B sh ir al-Isl miyya
ABD AL-WAHH B
2004); and ABD ALL H AL-HIL L , AL-TAQ D AL-FIQH INDA AL-Q
AL-BAGHD D AL-M LIK : AL-QAW ID AL-FIQHIYYA AL-MUMAYYAZA LI-FIQH AL-M LIKIYYA
NAM DHAJAN (Ma ba at nf 2004). In Hanbal law, the seventeenth to nineteenth
centuries run of legal canons literature ended with a anaf jurist, Ahmad b. Abd
All h al-Q r (d. 1359/1940), who wrote a commentary on the Mecelle according to the
Hanbal school called Majallat al-a k m al-shar iyya al madhhab al-Im m Ahmad b.
Hanbal. Perhaps having had their interest piqued by this intervention, anbal jurists
then published several works on legal canons, including Sa d ’s (d. 1376/1956–7),
Ris la f al-qaw id al-fiqhiyya, al-Qaw id wa l-u l al-j mi a wa l-fur q wa l-taq s m al-bad a
al-n fi a and his Tar q al-wu l il ilm al-ma m l bi-ma rifat al- aw bi wa l-qaw id wa-lu l. More recently, al9, N sir b. Abd All h b. Abd al- Az z al-Maym n published alKulliyy t al-fiqhiyya f al-madhhab al-Hanbal (n.p., 2003–4).
136. Sa d al-Sh w recently published a work on legal canons in Sh fi law entitled Maq sidiyyat al-qaw id al-fiqhiyya min khil l Kit b Qaw id al-a k m f i la al-an m liIzz al-D n b. Abd al-Sal m (D r al-Kalima 2015). Likewise, Mu ammad Umaym alHis n al-Mujaddid published Qaw id al-fiqh with some 426 anaf canons (n.p. 1986),
and Mu af Ma m d Azhar published a commentary on an earlier anaf text on
legal canons, Shar Qaw id al-Kh dim (D r Ibn al-Qayyim 2013).
137. For a few of the more notable works, see, e.g., MU AMMAD AL-HUSAYN L
K SHIF GHIT (d. 1373/1954), TAHR R AL-MAJALLA (al-Majma al- lam 2001) (a
commentary on the Ottoman Civil Code, the Mecelle); MU AF MU AQQIQ D M D,
QAV ID-I FIQH (Markaz-i Nashr-i Ul m-i Isl m 2000); HASAN AL-BUJN RD (d.
1395/1975), AL-QAW ID AL-FIQHIYYA (H d 1998); MU AMMAD F IL LANKAR N , ALQAW ID AL-FIQHIYYA (Mihr 1995); MU AMMAD K IM AL-MU AFAW , AL-QAW ID:
MI AT Q IDA FIQHIYYA MA NAN WA-MADRAKAN WA-MAWRIDAN (Mu assasat al-Nashr alIsl m 1991–2).
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parison within Islamic law.138 Moreover, in almost every country with a
Muslim presence, whether Muslim-majority or not, legal canons play a
sizeable role in jurists’ opinions (fatw s), which, are issued by non-stateaffiliated experts on Islamic law to offer religious guidance to ordinary
people.139
What are we to make of this focus on legal canons in the vexed views
of and approaches to interpretation in the Muslim world today? With renewed interest in Islamic law for both scholarly and public purposes, it
may be that the history of Islamic legal canons has become as relevant
again as essential to understanding Islamic law today as it once was in the
past. It may also be essential to developing theories about the practices of
an ongoing use of legal canons comparatively in the classroom and in the
courtroom for reading and interpreting law.

138. See, for instance, the work featuring a first-time treatises on legal canons in
Ib d law (the majority tradition in Oman and in parts of East and North Africa):
MAHM D MUS AF ABB D HARM SH, MU JAM AL-QAW ID AL-FIQHIYYA AL-IB IYYA
(Ridw n al-Sayyid ed., Wiz rat al-Aqw f wa l-Shu n al-Isl miyya 2010); MU AF B.
AMW ARSH M, AL-QAW ID AL-FIQHIYYA INDA AL-IB IYYA (Wiz rat al-Aqw f wa lShu n al-Isl miyya 2013).
139. For a brief discussion of such developments, see RABB, supra note 21, at
317–21.
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